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ABSTRACT
We show analytically that in a rational expectations present value model, an asset price manifests
near random walk behavior if fundamentals are I(1) and the factor for discounting future
fundamentals is near one. We argue that this result helps explain the well known puzzle that
fundamental variables such as relative money supplies, outputs, inflation and interest rates provide
little help in predicting changes in floating exchange rates. As well, we show that the data do exhibit
a related link suggested by standard models - that the exchange rate helps predict these
fundamentals. The implication is that exchange rates and fundamentals are linked in a way that is
















A longstanding puzzle in international economics is the difficulty of tying floating exchange rates 
to macroeconomic fundamentals such as money supplies, outputs, and interest rates.  Our theories state 
that the exchange rate is determined by such fundamental variables, but floating exchange rates between 
countries with roughly similar inflation rates are in fact well-approximated as random walks.   
Fundamental variables do not help predict future changes in exchange rates.   
Meese and Rogoff (1983a, 1983b) first established this result.  They evaluated the out-of-sample 
fit of several models of exchange rates, using data from the 1970s.  They found that by standard measures 
of forecast accuracy, such as the mean-squared deviation between predicted and actual exchange rate, 
accuracy generally increased when one simply forecast the exchange rate to remain unchanged compared 
to when one used the predictions from the exchange rate models.  While a large number of studies have 
subsequently claimed to find success for various versions of fundamentals-based models, sometimes at 
longer horizons, and over different time periods, the success of these models has not proven to be robust.  
A recent comprehensive study by Cheung, Chinn, and Pascual (2002) concludes, “the results do not point 
to any given model/specification combination as being very successful.  On the other hand, it may be that 
one model will do well for one exchange rate, but not for another.”       
In this paper, we take a new line of attack on the question of the link between exchange rates and 
fundamentals.  We work with a conventional class of asset-pricing models, in which the exchange rate is 
the expected presented discounted value of a linear combination of observable fundamentals and 
unobservable shocks.  Linear driving processes are posited for fundamentals and shocks. 
We first present a theorem concerning the behavior of an asset price determined in a present-
value model.  We show analytically that in the class of present value models we consider, asset prices will 
follow a process arbitrarily close to a random walk if (1) at least one forcing variable (observable 
fundamental or unobservable shock) has a unit autoregressive root, and (2) the discount factor is near 
unity.  So, in the limit, as the discount factor approaches unity, the change in the time t asset price will be 
uncorrelated with information known at time t-1.  We explain below that our result is not an application 
of the simple efficient markets model of Samuelson (1965) and others.  When that model is applied to 2 
 
exchange rates, it implies that cross-country interest rate differentials will predict exchange rate changes 
and thus that exchange rates will not follow a random walk. 
Intuitively, as the discount factor approaches unity, the model puts relatively more weight on 
fundamentals far into the future in explaining the asset price.  Transitory movements in the fundamentals 
become relatively less important compared to the permanent components.  Imagine performing a 
Beveridge-Nelson decomposition on the linear combination of fundamentals that drive the asset price, 
expressing it as the sum of a random walk component and a transitory component.  The class of 
theoretical models we are considering then expresses the asset price as the discounted sum of the current 
and expected future fundamentals.  As the discount factor approaches one, the variance of the change of 
discounted sum of the random walk component approaches infinity, while the variance of the change of 
the stationary component approaches a constant.  So the variance of the change of the asset price is 
dominated by the change of the random walk component as the discount factor approaches one.  
We view as unexceptionable the assumption that a forcing variable has a unit root, at least as a 
working hypothesis for our study.  The assumption about the discount factor is, however, open to debate.  
We note that in reasonable calibrations of some exchange rate models, this discount factor in fact is quite 
near unity.  
Of course our analytical result is a limiting one.  Whether a discount factor of .9 or .99 or .999 is 
required to deliver a process statistically indistinguishable a random walk depends on the sample size 
used to test for random walk behavior, and the entire set of parameters of the model.  Hence we present 
some correlations calculated analytically in a simple stylized model.  We assume a simple univariate 
process for fundamentals, with parameters chosen to reflect quarterly data from the recent floating period.  
We find that discount factors above 0.9 suffice to yield near zero correlations between the period t 
exchange rate and period t-1 information.  We do not attempt to verify our theoretical conclusion that 
large discount factors account for random walk behavior in exchange rates using any particular 
fundamentals model from the literature.  That is, we do not pick specific models that we claim satisfy the 
conditions of our theorem, and then estimate them and verify that they produce random walks. 3 
 
But if the present-value models of exchange rates imply random walk behavior, so that exchange 
rate changes are unpredictable, how then can we validate the models?  We ask instead if these 
conventional models have implications for whether the exchange rate helps predict fundamentals.  It is 
plausible to look in this direction.  Surely much of the short-term fluctuations in exchange rates are driven 
by changes in expectations about the future.  If the models are good approximations, and expectations 
reflect information about future fundamentals, the exchange rate changes will likely be useful in 
forecasting these fundamentals.  So these models suggest that exchange rates Granger-cause the 
fundamentals.   Using quarterly bilateral dollar exchange rates, 1974-2001, for the dollar versus the six 
other G7 countries, we find some evidence of such causality, especially for nominal variables. 
The statistical significance of the predictability is not uniform, and suggests a link between 
exchange rates and fundamentals that perhaps is modest in comparison with the links between other sets 
of economic variables.  But in our view, the statistical predictability is notable in light of the far weaker 
causality from fundamentals to exchange rates.  
For countries and data series for which there is statistically significant evidence of Granger 
causality, we next gauge whether the Granger causality results are consistent with our models.  We 
compare the correlation of exchange rate changes with two estimates of the change in the present 
discounted value of fundamentals.  One estimate uses only the lagged value of fundamentals.  The other 
uses both the exchange rate and own lags.  We find that the correlation is substantially higher when the 
exchange rate is used in estimating the present discounted value. 
To prevent confusion, we note that our finding that exchange rates predict fundamentals is 
distinct from our finding that large discount factors rationalize a random walk in exchange rates.  It may 
be reasonable to link the two findings.  When expectations of future fundamentals are very important in 
determining the exchange rate, it seems natural to pursue the question of whether exchange rates can 
forecast those fundamentals.  But one can be persuaded that exchange rates Granger cause fundamentals, 
and still argue that the approximate random walk in exchange rates is not substantially attributable to a 
large discount factor.  In the class of models we consider, all our empirical results are consistent with at 4 
 
least one other explanation, namely, that exchange rate movements are dominated by unobserved shocks 
that follow a random walk. The plausibility of this explanation is underscored by the fact that we 
generally fail to find cointegration between the exchange rate and observable fundamentals, a failure that 
is rationalized in our class of models by the presence of an I(1) (though not necessarily random walk) 
shock.  As well, the random walk also can arise in models that fall outside the class we consider. It does 
so in models with small sample biases, perhaps combined nonlinearities/threshold effects (see Taylor, 
Peel, and Sarno (2002), Kilian and Taylor (2003) and Rossi (2003).)  Exchange rates will still predict 
fundamentals in such models, though a nonlinear forecasting process may be required. 
Our suggestion that the exchange rate will nearly follow a random walk when the discount factor 
is close to unity means that forecasting changes in exchange rate is difficult, but perhaps still possible.  
Some recent studies have found success at forecasting changes in exchange rates at longer horizons, or 
using nonlinear methods, and further research along these lines may prove fruitful.  Mark (1995), Chinn 
and Meese (1995), and MacDonald and Taylor (1994) have all found some success in forecasting 
exchange rates at longer horizons imposing long-run restrictions from monetary models.  Groen (2000) 
and Mark and Sul (2001) find greater success using panel methods.  Kilian and Taylor (2001) suggest that 
models that incorporate nonlinear mean-reversion can improve the forecasting accuracy of fundamentals 
models, though it will be difficult to detect the improvement in out-of-sample forecasting exercises. 
The paper is organized as follow.  Section 2 presents the theorem that the random walk in asset 
prices may result from a discount factor near one in a present value model.  Section 3 demonstrates how 
the theorem applies to some models of exchange rates.  Section 4 presents evidence that changes in 
exchange rates help predict fundamentals.  Section 5 concludes.  An Appendix has some algebraic details.  
An additional appendix containing empirical results omitted from the paper to save space is available on 
request. 
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2. RANDOM WALK IN ASSET PRICE AS DISCOUNT FACTOR GOES TO ONE 
We consider models in which an asset price,  t s , can be expressed as a discounted sum of current 
and expected future “fundamentals.”  We examine asset-pricing models of the form: 
(2.1)   12 00 (1 ) ( ) ( )
jj
tt t j t t j jj sbb E a x b b E a x
∞∞
++ ==
′′ =− + ∑∑ ,  01 b < <  
where  t x  is the ( 1 × n ) vector of fundamentals, b is a discount factor, and  1 a  and  2 a  are ( 1 × n ) vectors.  
For example, the model for stock prices considered by Campbell and Shiller (1987) and West (1988) is of 
this form, where  t s  is the level of the stock price,  t x  the dividend (a scalar),  1 0 a =  and  2 1 a = .  The log-
linearized model of the stock price of Campbell and Shiller (1988) is also of this form, where  t s  is the log 
of the stock price,  t x  the log of the dividend,  1 1 a =  and  2 0 a = .  The term structure model of Campbell 
and Shiller (1987) also is a present-value model, where  t s  is the yield on a consol,  t x  the short-term rate, 
1 1 a =  and  2 0 a = .  In section 3, we review models in which  t s  is the log of the exchange rate, and  t x  
contains such variables as interest rates, and logs of prices, money supplies, and income. 
We spell out here the sense in which the asset price should follow a random walk for a discount 
factor b that is near 1.  Assume that at least one element of the vector  t x  is an I(1) process, whose Wold 
innovation is the ( 1 × n ) vector  t ε .  Our result requires that either (1)  1 t ax ′ ~ I(1),  2 0 a = , or (2)  2 t ax ′ ~ 
I(1), with the order of integration of  1 t ax ′  essentially unrestricted (I(0), I(1) or identically 0).  In either 
case, for b near 1,  t s ∆  will be well approximated by a linear combination of the elements of the 
unpredictable innovation  t ε .  In a sense made precise in the Appendix, this approximation is arbitrarily 
good for b arbitrarily near 1.  This means, for example, that all autocorrelations of  t s ∆  will be very near 
zero for b very near 1. 
Of course, there is continuity in the autocorrelations in the following sense: for b near 1, the 
autocorrelations of  t s ∆  will be near zero if the previous paragraph’s condition that certain variables are 
I(1) is replaced with the condition that those variables are I(0) but with an autoregressive root very near 6 
 
one.  For a given autoregressive root less than one, the autocorrelations will not converge to zero as b 
approaches 1.  But they will be very small for b very near 1. 
Table 2.1 gives an indication of just how small “small” is.  The table gives correlations of  t s ∆  
with time t-1 information when  t x  follows a scalar univariate AR(2).  (One can think of  1 0 a =  and 
2 1 a = , or  1 1 a =  and  2 0 a = .  One can consider these two possibilities interchangeably since for given 
1 < b , the autocorrelations of  t s ∆  are not affected by whether or not a factor of 1-b multiplies the present 
value of fundamentals.)  Lines (1)-(9) assume that  t x ~ I(1) – specifically,  t x ∆  ~ AR(1) with parameter 
ϕ .  We see that for  5 . 0 = b  the autocorrelations in columns (4)-(6) and the cross-correlations in columns 
(7)-(9) are appreciable.  Specifically, suppose that one uses the conventional standard error of  T / 1 .  
Then when  5 . 0 = ϕ , a sample size larger than 55 will likely suffice to reject the null that the first 
autocorrelation of  t s ∆  is zero (since row (2), column (5) gives  269 . 0 ) , ( 1 = ∆ ∆ − t t s s corr , and 
0 . 2 ] 55 / 1 /[ 269 . 0 ≈ ).  (In this argument, we abstract from sampling error in estimation of the 
autocorrelation.)  But for  9 . 0 = b , the autocorrelations are dramatically smaller.  For  9 . 0 = b ,  5 . 0 = ϕ , a 
sample size larger than 1600 will be required, since  0 . 2 ] 1600 / 1 /[ 051 . 0 ≈ .  Finally, in connection with 
the previous paragraph’s reference to autoregressive roots less than one, we see in lines (10)-(13) in the 
table that if the unit root in  t x  is replaced by an autoregressive root of 0.9 or higher, the auto- and 
cross-correlations of  t s ∆  are not much changed.  
To develop intuition on this result, consider the following example.  Suppose the asset price is 
determined by a simple equation: 
1 (1 ) ( ) tt t t t s bm b b E s ρ + =− + + . 
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Assume the first-differences of the fundamentals follow first order autoregressions: 7 
 
 
  mt t t m m ε φ + ∆ = ∆ −1 ;   1 ttt ρ ρ γρ ε − ∆= ∆ + . 
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.  In this case, the variance of 
the change in the exchange rate is finite as  1 → b .  If  0 t ρ ≠ , then as  1 → b ,  constant tt s ρ ε ∆≈ × .  In this 
case, as b increases, the variance of the change in the exchange rate gets large, but the variance is 
dominated by the i.i.d. term  t ρ ε . 
In section 3, we demonstrate the applicability of this result to exchange rates. 
 
3. EXCHANGE RATE MODELS 
Exchange rate models since the 1970s have emphasized that nominal exchange rates are asset 
prices, and are influenced by expectations about the future.  The “asset-market approach to exchange 
rates” refers to models in which the exchange rate is driven by a present discounted sum of expected 
future fundamentals.  Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, p. 529) say, “One very important and quite robust 
insight is that the nominal exchange rate must be viewed as an asset price.  Like other assets, the 
exchange rate depends on expectations of future variables.” [Italics in the original.]  Frenkel and Mussa’s 
(1985) survey explains the asset-market approach (p. 726): “These facts suggest that exchange rates 
should be viewed as prices of durable assets determined in organized markets (like stock and commodity 
exchanges) in which current prices reflect the market’s expectations concerning present and future 
economic conditions relevant for determining the appropriate values of these durable assets, and in which 
price changes are largely unpredictable and reflect primarily new information that alters expectations 
concerning these present and future economic conditions.” 8 
 
A variety of models relate the exchange rate to economic fundamentals and to the expected future 
exchange rate.  We write this relationship as: 
(3.1)   11 22 1 (1 )( ) ( ) tt t t t t t s bf z b f z b E s + =− + + + + . 
Here, we define the exchange rate  t s  as the log of the home currency price of foreign currency (dollars 
per unit of foreign currency, if the U.S. is the home country.)   it f  and  it z  ( 1,2 i = ) are economic 
fundamentals that ultimately drive the exchange rate, such as money supplies, money demand shocks, 
productivity shocks, etc.  We differentiate between fundamentals observable to the econometrician,  it f , 
and those that are not observable,  it z .  One possibility is that the true fundamental is measured with error, 
so that  it f  is the measured fundamental and the  it z  include the measurement error; another is  it z  is 
unobserved shocks. 
Upon imposing the “no bubbles” condition that  j t t
j s E b +  goes to zero as  ∞ → j , we have the 
present value relationship 
(3.2)   11 22 00 (1 ) ( ) ( )
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This equation is of the form of equation (2.1), where we have  11 1 tj tj tj ax f z +++ ′ =+, and 
22 2 tj tj tj ax f z +++ ′ =+.  We now outline some models that fit into this framework. 
 
A. Money-Income Model 
Consider first the familiar monetary models of Frenkel (1976), Mussa (1976), and Bilson (1978); 
and their close cousins, the sticky-price monetary models of Dornbusch (1976) and Frankel (1979).   
Assume in the home country there is a money market relationship given by: 
(3.3)   mt t t t t v i y p m + − + = α γ . 9 
 
Here,  t m  is the log of the home money supply,  t p  is the log of the home price level,  t i  is the level of the 
home interest rate,  t y  is the log of output, and  mt v  is a shock to money demand.  Here and throughout we 
use the term “shock” in a somewhat unusual sense.  Our “shocks” potentially include constant and trend 
terms, may be serially correlated, and may include omitted variables that in principle could be measured.  








t y , and 
*
mt v , and the parameters of the foreign money demand are identical to the home 
country’s parameters. 
The nominal exchange rate equals its purchasing power parity value plus the real exchange rate: 
(3.4)   t t t t q p p s + − =
* . 
In financial markets, the interest parity relationship is 
(3.5)  t t t t t t i i s s E ρ + − = − +
*
1  
Here  t ρ  is the deviation from rational expectations uncovered interest parity.  It can be interpreted as a 
risk premium or an expectational error. 
Putting these equations together and rearranging,  
(3.6)  [] 1
* * *
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b , the 
observable fundamentals are given by 
**
1 () ttt t t fm m y y γ =−− − , and the unobservables are: 
*
1 () tt m tm t z qvv =− −  and  2tt z ρ =− .   Following Mark (1995), our empirical work in section 4 sets  1 = γ .  
We also investigate a version of this model setting 
*
1ttt f mm = − , and moving 
*
tt y y −  to  1t z .  We do so 
largely because we wish to conduct a relatively unstructured investigation into the link between exchange 
rates and various measures of fundamentals.  But we could argue that we focus on 
*
t t m m −  because 10 
 
financial innovation has made standard income measures poor proxies for the level of transactions.   
Similarly, we investigate the relationship between  t s  and 
*
t t y y − . 
Equation (3.6) is implied by both the flexible-price and sticky-price versions of the monetary 
model.  In the flexible-price monetarist models of Frenkel (1976), Mussa (1976), and Bilson (1978), 
output,  t y , and the real exchange rate,  t q , are exogenous.  In the sticky-price models of Dornbusch 
(1976) and Frankel (1979), these two variables are endogenous.  Because nominal prices adjust slowly, 
the real exchange rate is influenced by changes in the nominal exchange rate.  Output is demand 
determined, and may respond to changes in the real exchange rate, income and real interest rates.   
Nonetheless, since equation (3.3) (and its foreign counterpart), (3.4), and (3.5) hold in the Dornbusch-
Frankel model, one can derive relationship (3.6) in those models.  Dornbusch and Frankel each consider 
special cases for the exogenous monetary processes (in Dornbusch, all shocks to the money supply are 
permanent; Frankel considers permanent shocks to the level and to the growth rate of money.)  As a result 
of their assumption that all shocks are permanent, they each can express the exchange rate purely in terms 
of current fundamentals, which may obscure the general implication that exchange rates depend on 
expected future fundamentals. 
We note here that some recent exchange-rate models developed from the “new open economy 
macroeconomics” yield very similar relationships to the ones we describe in this section.  For example, in 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002), the exchange rate is given by (their equation (30): 
(3.7)    
*
0 (1 )( )
j
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where we have translated their notation to be consistent with ours.  Equation (3.7) is in fact the forward 
solution to a special case of equation (3.6) above.  The discount factor, b, in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) 
is related to the semi-elasticity of money demand exactly as in equation (3.6).  However, their money 
demand function is derived from a utility-maximizing framework in which real balances appear in the 
utility function, and their risk premium  t ρ  is derived endogenously from first principles. 
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B.  Taylor-Rule Model 
Here we draw on the burgeoning literature on Taylor rules.  Let  1 − − = t t t p p π  denote the 
inflation rate, and 
g
t y  be the “output gap”.  We assume that the home country (the U.S. in our empirical 
work) follows a Taylor rule of the form: 
(3.8)   t t
g
t t v y i + + = π β β 2 1 . 
In (3.8),  0 1 > β ,  1 2 > β , and the shock  t v  contains omitted terms.
 1  








* ) ( t t
g
t t t t v y s s i + + + − − = π β β β . 
In (3.9),  1 0 0 < < β , and 
*
t s  is a target for the exchange rate.  We will assume that monetary authorities 
target the PPP level of the exchange rate: 
(3.10)  
* *
t t t p p s − = . 
Since  t s  is measured in dollars per unit of foreign currency, the rule indicates that ceteris paribus the 
foreign country raises interest rates when its currency depreciates relative to the target.  Clarida, Gali and 
Gertler (1998) estimate monetary policy reaction functions for Germany and Japan (using data from 
1979-1994) of a form similar to equation (3.9).  They find that a one percent real depreciation of the mark 
relative to the dollar led the Bundesbank to increase interest rates (expressed in annualized terms) by five 
basis points, while the Bank of Japan increased rates by 9 basis points in response to a real yen 
depreciation relative to the dollar. 
As the next equation makes clear, our argument still follows if the U.S. were also to target 
exchange rates.  We omit the exchange rate target in (3.8) on the interpretation that U.S. monetary policy 
has virtually ignored exchange rates except, perhaps, as an indicator. 
                                                 
1 Much of the Taylor rule literature—wisely, in our view—puts expected inflation in the monetary policy rule.  
Among other benefits, this facilitates thinking of the monetary authority as setting an ex-ante real rate.  We use 
actual inflation for notational simplicity.  If expected inflation is in the monetary rule, then inflation in the formulas 
below is replaced by expected inflation. 
. 12 
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Use interest parity (3.5) to substitute out for 
*
t t i i − , and (3.10) to substitute out for the exchange 
rate target: 
(3.12) 




() [ ( ) () ]
11 1
gg
tt t t t t t t t tt t s pp y y vv E s
β
ββ π π ρ
ββ β
+ =− − − + − + − + +
++ +
. 
This equation is of the general form (3.1) of the expected discounted present value models.  The discount 




.   We have 
*
1ttt fp p = − .  In our empirical work (in section 4), we will treat the 
remaining variables as unobservable, so we have 
** *
21 2 [( ) ( ) ]
gg
tt t t t t t t zy y v v β βπ π ρ =− − + − + − + . 
Equation (3.11) can be expressed another way, again using interest parity (3.5), and the equation 
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This equation is very much like (3.12), except that it incorporates the interest differential, 
*
t t i i − , as a 
“fundamental”.  The discount factor in this formulation is given by  0 1 β − .  The observed fundamental is 
given by 
**
1ttt t t fi ip p =−+ − .  In our empirical work, we treat the remaining period t variables in 
equation (3.13) as unobserved. 
 
C. Discussion 
We begin by noting that the classic efficient markets model of Samuelson (1965) and others does 
not predict a random walk in exchange rates.  The essence of this model is that there are no predictable 
profit opportunities for a risk-neutral investor to exploit.  If the U.S. interest rate  t i  is higher than foreign 
interest rate 
*
t i  by x%, then the U.S. dollar must be expected to fall by x% over the period of the 13 
 
investment if there is to be no such opportunities.  In terms of equation (3.5), then, the classic efficient 
markets model says that the risk premium  t ρ  is zero, and that a population regression of  1 t s + ∆  on 
*
tt ii −  
will yield a coefficient of 1.  (For equities, the parallel prediction is that the day a stock goes ex-dividend 
its price should fall by the amount of the dividend (e.g., Elton and Gruber (1970).) 
Our explanation yields a random walk approximation even when, as in the previous paragraph, 
uncovered interest parity holds.  The reader may wonder how the data can simultaneously satisfy: (1) a 
regression of  1 t s + ∆  on 
*
tt ii −  yields a nonzero coefficient, and (2)  t s  is arbitrarily well approximated as a 
random walk (i.e.,  1 t s + ∆  is arbitrarily well approximated as white noise).   The answer is that when b is 
arbitrarily close to 1, the R
2 of the regression of  1 t s + ∆  on 
*
tt ii −  will be arbitrarily close to zero, and the 
correlation of  1 t s + ∆  with 
*
tt ii −  will be arbitrarily small.  It is in those senses that the random walk 
approximation will be arbitrarily good. 
The key question is not the logic of our result but its empirical validity. The result does not 
require uncovered interest parity, which was maintained in the previous two paragraphs merely to clarify 
the relation of our result to the standard efficient markets result.  Instead, two conditions are required.  
The first is that fundamentals variables be very persistent – I(1) or nearly so.  This is arguably the case 
with our data on the observed fundamentals.  We will present evidence in section 4 that we cannot reject 
the null of a unit root in any of our data.   Further, there is evidence in other research that the 
unobservable variables are very persistent.  For the money-income model (equation (3.6)), this is 
suggested for  mt v ,  t q , and  t ρ  by the literature on money demand, e.g., Sriram (2000); purchasing power 
parity, e.g., Rogoff (1996); and, interest parity, e.g., Engel, (1996).  (We recognize that theory suggests 
that a risk premium like  t ρ  is I(0); our interpretation is that if  t ρ  is I(0), it has a very large 
autoregressive root.)  We are not concerned  if t ρ or other variables are highly persistent I(0) variables 
rather than I(1) variables, for we saw in lines (10)-(13) of Table 2.1 that a near random walk can result for 
such processes. 14 
 
A second condition for  t s to follow an approximate random walk is that b is sufficiently close to 
1.  The evidence we present below in Table 4.1 on the first-order autocorrelations for the exchange-rate 
fundamentals suggests that the lines in Table 2.1 most relevant to our data are those with  3 . 0 = ϕ  or 
5 . 0 = ϕ .  If so, Table 2.1 suggests that if b is around 0.9 or above, the asset price appears to be nearly 
indistinguishable from a random walk.  






b .  Bilson (1978) estimates  60 ≈ α  in the monetary model, while Frankel (1979) finds  29 ≈ α .  
The estimates from Stock and Watson (1993, Table 2, panel I, page 802) give us  40 ≈ α .
2  They imply a 
range for b of 0.97 to 0.98 for quarterly data. 
To get a sense of the plausibility of this discount factor, compare it to the discount factor implied 
in a theoretical model in which optimal real balance holdings are derived from a money-in-the-utility-
function framework.  Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) derive a money demand function that is very similar to 
equation (3.3), when utility is separable over consumption and real balances, and money enters the utility 


















.  They show that  i ε α / 1 ≈ , where i  is the steady-state 
nominal interest rate in their model.  They state (p. 27), “Assuming time is measured in years, then a 
value between 0.04 and 0.08 seems reasonable for i . It is usually thought that ε  is higher than one, 
though not necessarily by a large margin.  Thus, based on a priori reasoning, it is not implausible to 
assume  15 / 1 = i ε .”  For our quarterly data, the value of α  would be 60, which is right in line with the 
estimate from Bilson cited above. 
                                                 
2 Bilson uses quarterly interest rates that are annualized and multiplied by 100 in his empirical study.  So his actual 
estimate of 15 . 0 = α should be multiplied by 400 to construct a quarterly discount rate.  MacDonald and Taylor 
(1993) estimate a discounted sum of fundamentals and test for equality with the actual exchange rate – following the 
methods of Campbell and Shiller (1987) for equity prices.  MacDonald and Taylor rely on the estimates of Bilson to 
calibrate their discount factor, but mistakenly use 0.15 instead of 60 as the estimate of α .  Stock and Watson’s data 
estimates also use annualized interest rates multiplied by 100, so we have multiplied their estimate by 400. 15 
 
  In the Taylor-rule model, the discount factor is large when the degree of intervention by the 
monetary authorities to target the exchange rate is small.  The strength of intervention is given by the 




 in the formulation of (3.12), or  0 1 β −  
in the representation in (3.13).  In practice, it seems as though foreign exchange intervention within the 
G7 has not been very active.  For example, if the exchange rate were 10 percent above its PPP value, it is 
probably an upper bound to guess that a central bank would increase the short-term interest rate by one 
percentage point (expressed on an annualized basis.)  With quarterly data, this would imply a value of b 
of about 0.975, which is consistent with the discount factors we imputed in the monetary models.   
Clarida, Gali and Gertler’s (1998) estimates of the monetary policy reaction functions for Germany and 
Japan over the 1979-1994 period find that a 10 percent real depreciation of the currency led the central 
banks to increase annualized interest rates by 50 and 90 basis points, respectively.  This translates to 
quarterly discount factors of 0.988 and 0.978. 
  Our result does not require that the fundamentals evolve exogenously to the exchange rate.  The 
result is not, however, consistent with a thought experiment that allows the stochastic process for the 
fundamentals to change as b gets near to 1.  But we can answer the question: with given data for 
fundamentals, and plausible values for b, will a present value model yield an approximate random walk?  
For the values of b taken from the literature (which we have just discussed), and for serial correlation 
plausible for exchange rate fundamentals (reported in Table 4.1 below), the figures in Table 2.1 indicate 
near random walk behavior. 
  We note that the presence of persistent deviations from uncovered interest parity, in the form of a 
risk premium or expectational error, could potentially play a large role in accounting for movements in 
exchange rates.  Equation (3.2) draws a distinction between fundamentals that are multiplied by the 
discount factor, b, ( t f2  and  t z2 ), and fundamentals that are multiplied by  b − 1  ( t f1  and  t z1 ).  As  1 → b , 
the former become increasingly dominant in determining exchange rate movements.  In both the money-
income model and the Taylor-rule model, the deviation from interest parity is like a  t z2  variable – an 16 
 
unobservable fundamental multiplied by b in equation (3.2).  This analysis alone cannot determine 
whether deviations from interest parity are very important.  A more detailed model would determine the 
size of these deviations.  (For example, in a particular model, it may be that the deviation from interest 
parity depends on the discount factor in such a way that as  1 → b , the deviation gets smaller.)  We note 
one model in which a theoretical risk premium is derived – that of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002).  They 
refer to the effect of the risk premium on the level of the exchange rate – the discounted present value of 
the risk premium – as the “level risk premium.”  They explicitly note that in their model the discount 
factor b is large, and that in turn means that a volatile deviation from interest parity has a large impact on 
the variance of exchange rate changes.  (See equation (3.7).) 
 
4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
  We have argued that when standard exchange rate models are plausibly calibrated, they have the 
property that the exchange rate should nearly follow a random walk.  Evidence that the exchange rate 
change is not predictable is an implication of the models, not evidence against the models.  But merely 
observing that exchange rates follow random walks is not a very complete validation of the models.   
There are other possible explanations of the random walk behavior of exchange rates.  The 
exchange rate may be dominated by unobservable shocks that are well-approximated by random walks – 
that is, that the  it z  from equation (3.1) are well-approximated by a random walk, and the variance of  t s ∆  
is dominated by the changes in  it z  rather than by changes in  it f .  The standard set of fundamentals 
(money, income, prices, interest rates) may not be important determinants of exchange rates, and instead 
there may be some other variable that models have not captured or which is unobserved that drives the 
exchange rate. 
  In this section, we consider an implication of asset pricing models: that the asset price might help 
to predict the fundamentals.  This basic insight led Campbell and Shiller (1987) to develop a test of 
present value models of asset prices.  We do not follow their method here, because we acknowledge the 17 
 
possibility of unobserved fundamentals (the  it z ), which make the exact method of Campbell and Shiller 
inapplicable.  However, our approach to model validation is inspired by the Campbell-Shiller 
methodology. 
A. Data and Basic Statistics 
We use quarterly data, usually 1974:1-2001:3 (with exceptions noted below).  With one 
observation lost to differencing, the sample size is  110 = T . 
We study bilateral US exchange rates versus the other six members of the G7: Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom.  The International Financial Statistics (IFS) CD-ROM is 
the source for the end of quarter exchange rate  t s  and consumer prices  t p .  The OECD’s Main Economic 
Indicators CD-ROM is the source for our data on the seasonally adjusted money supply,  t m  (M4 in the 
U.K., M1 in all other countries; 1978:1-1998:4 for France, 1974:1-1998:4 for Germany, 1975:1-1998:4 
for Italy).  The OECD is also the source for real, seasonally adjusted GDP,  t y , for all countries but 
Germany, which we obtain by combining IFS (1974:1-2001:1) and OECD (2001:2-2001:3) data, and 
Japan, which combines data from the OECD (1974:1-2002) with 2002:3 data from the web site of the 
Japanese Government’s Economic and Social Research Institute.  Datastream is the source for the interest 
rates,  t i , which are 3 month Euro rates (1975:1-2001:3 for Canada, 1978:3-2001:3 for Italy and Japan).  
We convert all data but interest rates by taking logs and multiplying by 100.  Through the rest of the 
paper, the symbols defined in this paragraph ( t s , t m , t y , t p ) refer to the transformed data. 
We focus on the bivariate relationship between  t s and the following five measures of 
fundamentals:  t m , t p ,  t i ,  t y ,  t t y m − . We briefly discuss results when we look at full systems of 
variables suggested by particular versions of the models sketched in section 3.  As noted in that section, 
we focus on the simple bivariate relationships because we wish to conduct a relatively unstructured 
investigation. 18 
 
Let  t f  denote a measure of “fundamentals” in the U.S. relative to abroad (for example, 
*
t t t m m f − = .)  Using Dickey-Fuller tests with a time trend included, we were generally unable to reject 
the null of a unit root in any of the five measures of  t f  (i.e., in  t m , t p ,  t i ,  t y , and  t t y m − ).  Hence our 
analysis presents statistics on  t f ∆  for all measures of fundamentals.  Even though we fail to reject unit 
roots for interest differentials, we are uneasy using interest differentials only in differenced form.  So we 
present statistics for both levels and differences of interest rates. 
Some basic statistics are presented in Table 4.1.  Row 1 is consistent with much evidence that 
changes in exchange rates are serially uncorrelated, and quite volatile.  The standard deviation of the 
quarterly change is over 5 percentage points for all except the Canadian dollar exchange rate.  First order 
autocorrelations are small, under 0.15 in absolute value.  Under the null of no serial correlation, the 
standard error on the estimator of the autocorrelation is approximately  1 . 0 / 1 ≈ T , so none of the 
estimates are significant at even the 10 percent level. 
Rows 2 through 7 present statistics on our measures of fundamentals.  A positive value for the 
mean indicates that the variable has been growing faster in the U.S. than abroad.  For example, the figure 
of -0.92 for the mean value of the U.S.- Italy inflation differential means that quarterly inflation was, on 
average, 0.92 percentage points lower in the U.S. than in Italy during the 1974-2001 period.  Of particular 
note is that the vast majority of estimates of first order autocorrelation coefficients suggest a rejection of 
the null of no serial correlation at the 10% level, and most do at the 5% level as well (again using an 
approximate standard error of 0.1).  (An exception to this pattern is in output differentials in row (7).  
None of the autocorrelations are significant at the 5% level, and only one (France, for which the estimate 
is 0.19) at the 10% level.)  The magnitude of the autocorrelations—less than 0.5 for virtually all 
differenced series—suggests that the for calibrating an exchange rate model, the relevant entries in Table 
2.1 are those with ϕ =0.3 or ϕ =0.5 but not ϕ =0.9. 19 
 
  For each country we conducted five cointegration tests, between  t s  and each of our measures of 
fundamentals, 
*
t t m m − ,
*
t t p p − ,
*
t t i i − , 
*
t t y y −  and  ) (
* *
t t t t y m y m − − − .  We used Johansen’s (1991) 
trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics, with critical values from Osterwald-Lenum (1992).  Each 
bivariate VAR contained four lags.  Of the 30 tests (6 countries, 5 fundamentals), we rejected the null of 
no cointegration at the 5 percent level in 5 instances using the trace statistic.  These were for 
*
t t m m − ,
*
t t p p − , and 
*
t t i i −  for Italy, and, 
*
t t p p − , and 
*
t t i i −  for the U.K.  Of the 30 tests using the 
maximum eigenvalue statistic, the null was rejected only once, for the U.K. for 
*
t t p p − .  We conclude 
that it will probably not do great violence to assume lack of cointegration, recognizing that a 
complementary analysis using cointegration would be useful. 
  We take the lack of cointegration to be evidence that unobserved variables such as real demand 
shocks, real money demand shocks, or possibly even interest parity deviations have a permanent 
component, or at least are very persistent.  Alternatively, it may be that the data we use to measure the 
economic fundamentals of our model have some errors with permanent or very persistent components.  
For example, it may be that the appropriate measure of the money supply has permanently changed 
because of numerous financial innovations over our sample, so that the M1 money supply series vary 
from the “true” money supply by some I(1) errors. 
 
B.  Granger-Causality Tests 
  Campbell and Shiller (1987) observe that when a variable  t s  is the present value of a variable  t x , 
then either (1)  t s  Granger causes  t x  relative to the bivariate information set consisting of lags of  t s  and 
t x , or (2),  t s  is an exact distributed lag of current and past values of  t x .  That is, as long as  t s  embodies 
some information in addition to that included in past values of  t x ,  t s  Granger causes  t x .
3  As was 
emphasized in the previous section, however, exchange rate models must allow for unobservable 
                                                 
3  In the appendix, this additional information is formalized as additional random variables that are used by private 
agents in forecasting future fundamentals. 20 
 
fundamentals – the possibility that  t x  is a linear combination of unobservable as well as observable 
variables, and thus  t x  itself is unobservable.  Failure to find Granger causality from  t s  to observable 
variables no longer implies an obviously untenable restriction that the exchange rate is an exact 
distributed lag of observables.  It is clear, though, that a finding of Granger causality is supportive of a 
view that exchange rates are determined as a present value that depends in part on observable 
fundamentals. 
Table 4.2 summarizes the results of our Granger causality tests on the full sample.  We include a 
constant and four lags of each variable in all causality tests reported in this and all other tables.  For all 
tests of no causality we use likelihood-ratio statistics using the degrees of freedom correction suggested in 
Sims (1980).  
We see in panel A that at the five percent level of significance, the null that that  t s ∆  fails to 
Granger cause  ) (
*
t t m m − ∆ , ) (
*
t t p p − ∆ ,
*
t t i i − ,  ) (
*
t t i i − ∆ ,  ) (
*
t t y y − ∆ , and  )] ( [
* *
t t t t y m y m − − − ∆ , can 
be rejected in 9 cases at the 5 percent level, and 3 more cases at the 10 percent level.  There are no 
rejections for Canada and the U.K., but rejections in 12 of the 24 tests for the other four countries.  The 
strongest rejections are for prices, where the null is rejected in three cases at the one percent level.
4 
  In a sense, this is not particularly strong evidence that exchange rates predict fundamentals.
 5  
After all, even if there were zero predictability, one would expect a handful of significant statistics just by 
chance.  We accordingly are cautions in asserting that the posited link is well established.  But one 
                                                 
4   The overall level of predictability, though not the pattern, is consistent with the point estimates in Stock and 
Watson (2003).  Using inflation and output from the G7 countries (rather than for six countries relative to the U.S.), 
and a 1985-99 sample, Stock and Watson (2003) examine the ability of the exchange rate (and many other financial 
variables) to forecast out-of-sample.  They find that the exchange rate lowers the mean squared prediction error for 
inflation in one country (Canada), for GDP in four countries (Canada, Germany, Italy and Japan).   Thus the overall 
rate of success (five out of fourteen data series) is comparable to ours, though the pattern (more success with real 
than nominal) is not.  We have not investigated the extent to which results differ because different series are being 
fit or because of in- versus out-of-sample. 
 
5   A referee has pointed out that for series other than interest rates, seasonal adjustment may be lead to spurious 
findings of causality.  We were not able to collect a complete set of not seasonally adjusted data.  But we did repeat 
our Granger-causality tests using money supply data that was not seasonally adjusted for the U.S., France, and Japan 
from International Financial Statistics.  Our findings were not affected by the use of n.s.a. money supply data: we 
reject no Granger causality at the 10% level for France, and at the 5% level for Japan.   (We were only able to obtain 
n.s.a. M2 money supply for Italy.  The p-value for the test of no causality was 20%. ) 21 
 
statistical (as opposed to economic) indication that the results are noteworthy comes from contrasting 
these results with ones for Granger causality tests running in the opposite direction.  We see in panel B of 
Table 3.2 that the null that the fundamentals fail to Granger cause  t s ∆  can be rejected at the 5 percent 
level in only one test, and at the 10 percent level in only one more test.  So, however modest is the 
evidence that exchange rates help to predict fundamentals, the evidence is distinctly stronger than that on 
the ability of fundamentals to predict exchange rates. 
  There were some major economic and non-economic developments during our sample that 
warrant investigation of sub-samples.  Several of the European countries’ exchange rates and monetary 
policies became more tightly linked in the 1990s because of the evolution of the European Monetary 
Union.  Germany’s economy was transformed dramatically in 1990 because of reunification.  We 
therefore look at causality results for two subsamples.  Table 4.3 presents results for 1974:1-1990:2, and 
Table 4.4 for the remaining part of the sample (1990:3-2001:2). 
  The results generally go the same direction as for the whole sample.  In Table 4.3A, we see that 
for the first part of the sample, we reject the null of no Granger causality from exchange rates to 
fundamentals at the one or five percent level in 10 cases, and at the ten percent level in 2 more cases.  
Table 4.3 B indicates that there are no cases in which we can reject the null of no Granger causality from 
fundamentals to exchange rates at the five percent level, and only 2 cases at the ten percent level. 
  Table 4.4 reports results for the second part of the sample.  Panel A shows we reject the null of no 
Granger causality from exchange rates to fundamentals in 9 cases at the one or five percent level, and five 
more cases at the 10 percent level.  But for the test of no causality from fundamentals to exchange rates, 
Panel B shows we reject nine times at the one or five percent level, once at the 10 percent level.  In the 
1990s, then, there appears to be more evidence of exchange-rate predictability.  This perhaps is not 
entirely surprising given the effort by the European countries to stabilize exchange rates.  We note, 
however, that several of the rejections of the null are for the yen/dollar rate. 22 
 
  In addition to the causality tests we report from bivariate VARs, we also performed cointegration 
and causality tests based on some multivariate VARs.  We chose several different combinations of 
variables to include in these VARs, based on the models outlined in Section 3.  There are five groupings: 
) ), ( ), ( , (
* * * ′ − − ∆ − ∆ ∆ t t t t t t t i i p p y y s ,  ) ) ( ), ( , (
* * ′ − ∆ − ∆ ∆ t t t t t y y m m s ,  ) ) ( ), ( , (
* * ′ − ∆ − ∆ ∆ t t t t t y y p p s , 
) ) ( ), ( ), ( , (
* * * ′ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ ∆ t t t t t t t p p y y m m s , and  ) ) ( ), ( ), ( , (
* * * ′ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ ∆ t t t t t t t i i p p y y s . All variables 
were entered in differences because of results of tests for cointegration.
6   We performed causality tests 
for the null that  t s ∆  does not Granger cause for each of the fundamentals or the fundamentals as a group, 
and conversely.  For example, in the first grouping (i.e.,  ) ), ( ), ( , (
* * * ′ − − ∆ − ∆ ∆ t t t t t t t i i p p y y s ), there 
were four tests of Granger causality from  t s ∆ , to each of the three fundamentals and to the block of 
fundamentals as a whole.  There was also the corresponding set of four tests from fundamentals to  t s ∆ .  
Across the six countries, this yielded 24 tests of causality in each direction for this grouping.  Across all 
five groupings, 108 test statistics were computed in each direction. 
  The results are very much like the results from the bivariate VARs.  There is almost no evidence 
of causality from the fundamentals to the exchange rate.  Of the 108 tests we performed, there are no 
cases  in which we could reject at the 5 percent level the hypothesis of no causality from fundamentals to 
exchange rates, and only four cases where that hypothesis is rejected at the 10 percent level.  In contrast, 
in 35 tests (out of 108 performed) we rejected the null of no causality from exchange rates to 
fundamentals at the 10 percent level, and these were significant at the 5 percent level in 16 cases.  We 
present details for the Granger causality tests on the fundamentals as a group in Table 4.5, relegating to 
the additional appendix details on the other tests.  As Table 4.5 demonstrates, there were no cases in 
which we rejected the joint null of no causality from the group of fundamentals to the exchange rate.  
Notable are the tests for whether the exchange rate does not Granger cause any of the economic 
fundamentals.  Table 4.5 reports that we reject the null of no causation in 16 of the 30 tests performed at 
                                                 
6    According to Johansen’s (1991) trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics, there were only three cases in which we 
were able to reject the null of no cointegration (one for Canada, and two for Italy), so for uniformity we treated all 
variables as if they were not cointegrated. 23 
 
the 10 percent level, and 12 of those were significant rejections at the 5 percent level.  Nonetheless, there 
were many more cases in which the exchange rate could not help predict fundamentals.  The exchange 
rate was found to be useful in forecasting real output in only two cases. 
  To summarize, while the evidence is far from overwhelming, there does appear to be a link from 
exchange rates to fundamentals, going in the direction that exchange rates help forecast fundamentals.   
 
C.  Correlation between ∆s and the Present Value of Fundamentals 
  The previous subsection established a statistically significant link between exchange rates and 
certain fundamentals.  We now examine such links to ask whether the signs of the regression coefficients 
are in some sense right.  The statistic we propose is broadly similar to one developed in Campbell and 
Shiller (1987).  The modification of the Campbell-Shiller statistic is necessary for two reasons.  First is 
that, unlike Campbell and Shiller, our variables are not well approximated as cointegrated.  Second is that 
we allow for unobservable forcing variables, again in contrast to Campbell and Shiller. 
  Write the present value relationship for exchange rates as  
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Our unit root tests indicate that  t f ∆ , and hence ∑
∞
= + ∆
0 j j t t
j f E b  are I(0), and that  t s  and  t f  are not 
cointegrated.  For (3.2) to be consistent with lack of cointegration between  t s  and  t f , we must have 
) 1 ( ~ I Ut .  A stationary version of (4.1) is then 
(4.3)   t t t U F s ∆ + ∆ = ∆ . 
 Let  it F  be the present value of future f’s computed relative to an information set indexed by the i 
subscript.  The two information sets we use are univariate and bivariate: 24 
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  We hope to get a feel for whether either of these information sets yield economically meaningful 
present values by estimating  ) , ( t it s F corr ∆ ∆ , the correlation between  it F ∆  and  t s ∆ .   The finding of 
Granger causality from exchange rates to observable fundamentals supports the view that exchange rates 
are determined as a present value that depends in part on these observables.  A more demanding 
verification of the relationship between exchange rates and observed fundamentals implied by the model 
is that  ) , ( t it s F corr ∆ ∆  be high.
7  
We estimate  ) , ( t it s F corr ∆ ∆  using estimates of  it F ∆  constructed from univariate autoregressions 
( t F1 ) or bivariate vector autoregressions ( t F2 ).  If the estimated correlation is substantially stronger using 
the bivariate estimate, we take that as evidence that the coefficients of  t s ∆  in the VAR equation for  t f ∆  
are economically reasonable and important.  We limit our analysis to the variables in which there is a 
statistically significant relationship between  t f ∆  and  t s ∆ , as indicated by the Granger causality tests in 
Table 4.2. 
  Note that a low value of the correlation is not necessarily an indication that  t s  is little affected by 
the present value of  t f .  A low correlation will result from a small covariance between  it F ∆  and  t s ∆ .  
But since  ) , cov( ) , cov( ) , cov( t it t it t it U F F F s F ∆ ∆ + ∆ ∆ = ∆ ∆ , this covariance might be small because a 
sharply negative covariance between  it F ∆  and  t U ∆  offsets a positive covariance between  it F ∆  and  t F ∆ .  
                                                 
7  Engel and West (2004) propose a method for calculating the variance of  t F ∆  (from equation (4.3)) relative to the 
variance of  t s ∆  25 
 
Conversely, of course, a high correlation might reflect a tight relationship between  it F ∆  and  t U ∆  with 
little connection between  it F ∆  and  t F ∆ .
8 
  We do, however, take as reasonable the notion that if the correlation is higher for the bivariate 
than for the univariate information set, the coefficients on lags of  t s ∆  in the  t f ∆  equation are 
economically meaningful. 
 We  construct  t F1 ˆ  from estimates of univariate autoregressions, and  t F2 ˆ  from bivariate VARs, 
imposing a value of the discount factor b.  The lag length is four in both the univariate and bivariate 
estimates.  We then estimate the correlations  ) , ( t it s F corr ∆ ∆  using these estimated  it F ˆ .  We report results 
only for data that show Granger causality from  t s ∆  to  t f ∆  at the 10 percent level or higher in the whole 
sample (Table 4.2, panel A).  We construct confidence intervals using the percentile method and a non-
parametric bootstrap.  We  sample with replacement from the bivariate VAR residuals, with actual data 
used as initial conditions.  We use 5000 replications.  For  t F1 ˆ  and  t F2 ˆ , we construct 90 percent 
confidence intervals using the .05 and .95 quantiles.  For  t F2 ˆ - t F1 ˆ , we use the .10 and 1.0 quantiles.  We 
do not attempt to control for the data dependent fact that we only study samples in which the previous 
subsection found Granger causality. 
  We tried three values of the discount factor,  5 . 0 = b ,  9 . 0 = b , and  98 . 0 = b .  Results were 
strongest for  98 . 0 = b .  So to be conservative we report results only for  5 . 0 = b ,  9 . 0 = b .  See Panels A 
and B, respectively, of Table 4.6.  For the univariate information set ( t F1 ), the three discount factors give 
very similar results.  Of the 10 estimated correlations, only two are positive for each value of b.  (All of 
the relations should be positive for the four variables reported in Table 4.6 --  ) (
*
t t m m − ∆ , ) (
*
t t p p − ∆ , 
                                                 
8 Since  t s  is an element of the bivariate information set, projection of both sides of (3.1) onto this information set 
yields  ) , , , , | ( 1 1 2 K − − + = t t t t t t t f s f s U E F s .  It may help readers familiar with Campbell and Shiller (1987) to 
note that because our models include unobserved forcing variables (i.e., because  t U  is present), we may not have 




t t i i − ∆ , and  )] ( [
* *
t t t t y m y m − − − ∆  -- according to the models of section 3, if the contribution of 
t U ∆  is sufficiently small.)  So if one relies on univariate estimates of the present value, one would find 
little support for the notion that changes in exchange rates reflect changes in the present value of 
fundamentals. 
The bivariate estimates lend rather more support for this notion, especially for  9 . 0 = b .  The 
estimated correlation between  t F2 ∆  and  t s ∆  is positive in 6 of the 10 cases for  5 . 0 = b  (though 
significantly different from zero at the 90% level in only one case [Japan,  ) ( * m m− ∆ ]); it is positive in 7 
of the 10 cases for  9 . 0 = b  and significant in 4 of these (all three inflation series, and  ) (
* i i − ∆ in Japan) .  
The sharpest result is that the correlation is higher for  t F2 ∆ than for  t F 1 ∆ : the difference between the two 
is positive and significant in 8 cases for b=0.5, positive in 9 cases and significant in 7 for b=0.9.
 9  The 
median correlations can be summarized as: 
 Information  set  0.5 b =   0.9 b =  
(4.6)            1t F     -0.04    -0.05 
            2t F      0.10     0.24 
  It is clear that using lags of  t s ∆  to estimate the present value of fundamentals results in an 
estimate that is more closely tied to  t s ∆  itself than when the present value of fundamentals is based on 
univariate estimates.  But even limiting ourselves to data in which there is Granger causality from  t s ∆  to 
t f ∆ , the largest single correlation in the table is 0.51 (Germany, for  ) (
*
t t p p − ∆ , when b=0.9.)  A 
correlation less than one may be due to omitted forcing variables,  t U .  In addition, we base our present 
values on the expected present discounted value of fundamental variables one at a time, instead of trying 
to find the appropriate linear combination (except when we use  y m −  as a fundamental.)  So we should 
not be surprised that the correlations are still substantially below one.   
                                                 
9 Here it is advisable to recall that we only examine series that display Granger causality.  So the statistical 
significance of the difference is unsurprising.  On the other hand, the sign of the difference (positive) was not 
foretold by our Granger causality tests. 27 
 
The long literature on random walks in exchange rates causes us to interpret the correlations in 
Table 4.6 as new evidence that exchange rates are tied to fundamentals.  We recognize, however, that 
these estimates leave a vast part of the movements in exchange rates not tied to fundamentals.  The results 
may suggest a direction for future research into the link between exchange rates and fundamentals – 
looking for improvements in the definition of fundamentals used to construct  t F2 . 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
  We view the results of this paper as providing some counterbalance to the bleak view of the 
usefulness (especially in the short run) of rational expectations present value models of exchange rates 
that has become predominant since Meese and Rogoff (1983a, 1983b).  We find that exchange rates may 
incorporate information about future fundamentals, a finding consistent with the present value models.  
We also show theoretically that under some empirically plausible circumstances the inability to forecast 
exchange rates is a natural implication of the models.  The models do suggest that innovations in the 
exchange rate ought to be highly correlated with news about future fundamentals – a link that seems to 
garner support from the recent study of Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003), who find strong 
evidence of exchange-rate reaction to news (and in a direction consistent with standard models) in intra-
day data.  
  On the other hand, our findings certainly do not provide strong direct support for these models, 
and indeed there are several caveats that deserve mention.  First, while our Granger causality results are 
consistent with the implications of the present value models – that exchange rates should be useful in 
forecasting future economic variables such as money, income, prices and interest rates – there are other 
possible explanations for these findings.  It may be, for example, that exchange rates Granger cause the 
domestic consumer price level simply because exchange rates are passed on to prices of imported 
consumer goods with a lag.  Exchange rates might Granger cause money supplies because monetary 
policy-makers react to the exchange rate in setting the money supply.  In other words, the present value 28 
 
models are not the only models that imply Granger causality from exchange rates to other economic 
variables.  Table 4.6, which concerns the correlation of exchange rate changes with the change in the 
expected discounted fundamentals, provides some evidence that the Granger causality results are 
generated by the present value models, but it is far from conclusive. 
  Second, the empirical results are not uniformly strong.  As well, it remains to be seen how well 
they hold upon, for example, use of panel data or out of sample techniques such as in Groen (2002), Mark 
and Sul (2001), or Stock and Watson (2003). 
  Third, while we read the exchange rate literature as agreeing with us that there is a role for 
“unobserved” fundamentals – money demand shocks, real exchange rate shocks, risk premiums – we 
recognize that others might view such a role as evidence of a failure of the model.  We do not find much 
evidence that the exchange rate is explained only by the “observable” fundamentals.  Our bivariate 
cointegration tests generally fail to find cointegration between exchange rates and fundamentals.   
Moreover, we know from Mark (2001) that actual exchange rates are likely to have a much lower 
variance than a discounted sum of observable fundamentals.  Our view is that it is perhaps unrealistic to 
believe that only fundamentals that are observable by the econometrician should affect exchange rates, 
but it is nonetheless important to note that observables do not obviously dominate exchange rate changes. 
  But perhaps our findings shift the terms of the exchange rate debate.  We have shown analytically 
that if discount factors are large (and fundamentals are I(1)), then it may not be surprising that present 
value models cannot outforecast the random walk model of exchange rates.  We have found some support 
for the link between fundamentals and the exchange rate is in the other direction – exchange rates can 
help forecast the fundamentals.  We tentatively conclude that exchange rates and fundamentals are linked 
in a way that is broadly consistent with asset pricing models of the exchange rate. 
  Finally, our analytical results may also help explain the near random walk behavior of other asset 
prices.  It is well know that as a theoretical matter, asset prices follow random walks only under very 
special circumstances.  A priority for future research investigating the power of our results to explain the 
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In this Appendix, we prove the statement in the text concerning random walk behavior in  t s  as 
the discount factor  1 → b . 
We suppose there is an ( 1 × n ) vector of fundamentals t x .  This vector includes all variables, 
observable as well as unobservable (to the economist), that private agents use to forecast  t f1 , t f2 , t z1 , and 
t z2 .  For example, we may have  9 = n ,  ) , , , , , , , , (
* * * ′ = t t t mt mt t t t t t u q v v y y m m x ρ , 
) (
* *
t t t t t y y m m f − − − = , with  t u  a variable that helps predict one or more of  t m , 
*
t m , t y , 
*
t y ,  mt v , 
*
mt v ,  t q , and  t ρ .  We assume that  t u  is a scalar only as an example; there may be a set of variables like 
t u .  We assume that  t x ∆  follows a stationary finite order ARMA process (possibly with one or more unit 
moving average roots – we allow  t x  to include stationary variables, as well as cointegrated I(1) 
variables.)  Let  t ε  denote the ( 1 × n ) innovation in  t x ∆ , and L the lag operator,  1 − = t t x Lx .  For 
notational simplicity we assume tentatively that  t x ∆  has zero mean.  Write the Wold representation of 
t x ∆  as  
 
(A.1)  j t j j t t L x −
∞
= ∑ = = ∆ ε θ ε θ
0 ) ( ,  I ≡ 0 θ . 
 
We define  j t t x E + ∆  as  ) , , | ( 1 K − + ∆ t t j t x E ε ε , and assume that mathematical expectations and linear 
projections coincide.   
Define the ( 1 × n ) vectors  t w1  and  t w2  as 
 
(A.2)  j t t j
j
t x E b b w +
∞
= ∑ − =
0 1 ) 1 ( ,  j t t j
j
t x E b b w +
∞
= ∑ =
0 2 ,  ) , ( 2 1 ′ ′ ′ = t t t w w w . 
 
Then  t s  is a linear combination of the elements of the elements of  t w1  and  t w2 , say  2
 
(A.3)   t t t w a w a s 2 2 1 1 ′ + ′ = . 
 
for suitable ( 1 × n )  1 a  and  2 a .  We assume that either (a)  t w a 1 1 ′  ~ I(1) and  0 2 ≡ a , or (b) if  0 2 ≠ a , 
t w a 2 2 ′  ~ I(1) with  t w a 1 1 ′  essentially unrestricted (stationary, I(1) or identically zero). 
We show the following below. 
1. Suppose  that 0 2 ≡ a  (that is,  0 = t ρ  in the monetary model).  Then 
 
(A.4)  0 ] ) 1 ( [ plim 1
1




a s ε θ . 
 
Here,  ) 1 ( θ  is an ( n n× ) matrix of constants,  ∑
∞
= =
0 ) 1 (
j j θ θ , for  j θ  defined in (A.1).  We note that if 
t x a1 ′  were stationary (contrary to what we assume when  0 2 = a ), then  0 ) 1 ( 1 = ′θ a , and (A.3) states that as 
b approaches1,  t s  approaches a constant.  But if  t x a1 ′  is I(1), as is arguably the case in our data, we have 
the claimed result: for b very near 1,  t s ∆  will behave very much like the unpredictable sequence 
t a ε θ ) 1 ( 1 ′ .   
2. Suppose that  0 1 ≡ a ,  0 2 ≠ a .  Then 
 
(A.5)  0 } ) 1 ( ] ) 1 {[( plim 2
1




a b s b ε θ . 
 
By assumption,  t x a2 ′  ~ I(1), so  0 ) 1 ( 2 ≠ ′θ a .  Then for b near one,  t s b ∆ − ) 1 (  will behave very much like 
the unpredictable sequence  t a ε θ ) 1 ( 2 ′ .  This means in particular that the correlation of  t s b ∆ − ) 1 (  with any 
information known at time t-1 will be very near zero.  Since the correlation of  t s ∆  with such information 
is identical to that of  t s b ∆ − ) 1 ( ,  t s ∆  will also be almost uncorrelated with such information.   
Let us combine (A.4) and (A.5).  Then for b near 1,  t s ∆  will be approximately uncorrelated with 
information known at t-1, since for b near 1  3
 
(A.6)  t t b ba a s ε θ ) 1 ( } )] 1 /( [ { 2 1 ′ − + ≈ ∆ . 
 
Two comments.  First, for any given  1 < b , the correlation of  t s ∆  with period t-1 information will 
be very similar for (1)  t x  processes that are stationary, but barely so, in the sense of having 
autoregressive unit roots near 1, and (2)  t x  processes that are I(1).  This is illustrated in the calculations 
in Table 4.1. 
Second, suppose that  t x ∆  has non-zero mean µ  ( 1 × n ). Then (A.6) becomes 
 
(A.7)  t t b ba a s ε θ µ )] 1 ( [ } )] 1 /( [ { 2 1 + ′ − + ≈ ∆ . 
 
Thus the exchange rate approximately follows a random walk with drift  µ } )] 1 /( [ { 2 1 ′ − + b ba a , if 
0 } )] 1 /( [ { 2 1 ≠ ′ − + µ b ba a . 
Proof of A.4:  
With elementary rearrangement, we have  
 
(A.8)  j t t j
j
t t x E b x w +
∞
= − ∆ + = ∑ 0 1 1 . 
 
Project (A.8) on period t-1 information and subtract from (A.8).  Since  t t t t t t w E w w E w 1 1 1 1 1 1 ∆ − ∆ = − − −  
and  0 1 1 1 = − − − − t t t x E x , we get 
 
(A.9)    t j t t j t t j
j
t t t b x E x E b w E w ε θ ) ( ) ( 1 0 1 1 1 = ∆ − ∆ = ∆ − ∆ + − +
∞
= − ∑ , 
 
the last equality following from Hansen and Sargent (1981).   Next, difference (A.8).  Upon rearranging 
the right hand side, we get  ) ( 1 0 1 j t t j t t j
j
t x bE x E b w + − +
∞
= ∆ − ∆ = ∆ ∑ .  Project upon period t-1 information 
and rearrange to get  4
 
(A.10)  j t t j
j
t t x E b b w E + −
∞
= − ∆ − = ∆ ∑ 1 0 1 1 ) 1 ( . 
 
From (A.3 ) (with  0 2 = a , by assumption), (A.8) and (A.9), 
 
(A.11)  j t t j
j
t t x E b b a b a s + −
∞
= ∆ − ′ + ′ = ∆ ∑ 1 0 1 1 ) 1 ( ) ( ε θ . 
 
Since  t x a ∆ ′ 1  is stationary,  j t t j
j x E b a + −
∞
= ∆ ′∑ 1 0 1  converges in probability to a stationary variable as 






,  j t t j
j x E b a b + −
∞
= ∆ ′ − ∑ 1 0 1 ) 1 (  converges in probability to zero as  1 → b .  
Hence  ] ) ( [ 1 t t b a s ε θ ′ − ∆  converges in probability to zero, from which (A.2) follows. 
Result (A.5) results simply by noting that when  0 1 ≡ a ,  j t t j
j
t x E b b b a s b +
∞
= ∑ − ′ = −
0 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( , 




  Population Auto- and Cross-correlations of ∆st 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6)    (7) (8) (9) 
       ---------    Correlation of  t s ∆  with:  ---------- 
  b  1 ϕ   ϕ     1 − ∆ t s   2 − ∆ t s   3 − ∆ t s     1 − ∆ t x   2 − ∆ t x   3 − ∆ t x  
(1)  0.50  1.0  0.3   0.15  0.05  0.01  0.16  0.05  0.01 
(2)      0.5   0.27  0.14  0.07  0.28  0.14  0.07 
(3)      0.8   0.52  0.42  0.34  0.56  0.44  0.36 
(4)  0.90  1.0  0.3   0.03  0.01  0.00  0.03  0.01  0.00 
(5)      0.5   0.05  0.03  0.01  0.06  0.03  0.01 
(6)      0.8   0.09  0.07  0.06  0.13  0.11  0.09 
(7)  0.95  1.0  0.3   0.02  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.00 
(8)      0.5   0.03  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.01 
(9)      0.8   0.04  0.04  0.03  0.07  0.05  0.04 
(10)  0.90  0.90  0.5   0.04 -0.01 -0.03  0.02 -0.03 -0.05 
(11) 0.90 0.95  0.5   0.05 0.01 -0.01    0.04 -0.00  -0.02 
(12)  0.95  0.95  0.5   0.02 -0.00 -0.01  0.01 -0.02 -0.03 




1. The model is  ∑
∞
= + − =
0 ) 1 (
j j t t
j
t x E b b s or  ∑
∞
= + =
0 j j t t
j
t x E b b s .  The scalar variable  t x  follows an 
AR(2) process with autoregressive roots  1 ϕ  and ϕ .  When  0 . 1 1 = ϕ ,  t x ∆  ~ AR(1) with parameter ϕ . 
 
2. The correlations in columns (4)-(9) were computed analytically.  If  0 . 1 1 = ϕ , as in rows (1) to (9), then 
in the limit, as  1 → b , each of these correlations approaches zero.  2
 
 Table 4.1 
 
Basic Statistics  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
   Canada  France Germany  Italy  Japan  U.K. 
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1. Variable definitions:  s ∆  = percentage change in dollar exchange rate (higher value indicates 
depreciation).  In other variables a “*” indicates a non-U.S. value, absence of “*” a U.S. value:  m ∆  = 
percentage change in M1 (M2 for U.K.);  y ∆ = percentage change in real GDP;  p ∆  = percentage change 
in consumer prices; i = short-term rate on government debt.  Money and output are seasonally adjusted.   
 
2. Data are quarterly, generally 1974:2-2001:3.  Exceptions include an end date of 1998:4 for 
* m m −  for 
France, Germany and Italy, start dates for 
* m m −  of 1978:1 for France, 1974:1 for Germany and 1975:1 
for Italy, and start dates for 
* i i −  of 1975:1 for Canada and 1978:3 for Italy and Japan. See the text. 
 
3. s.d. refers to the standard deviation of the indicated variable. ρ1 is the first-order autocorrelation 
coefficient of the indicated variable.  3
Table 4.2 
 
  Bivariate Granger Causality Tests, Different Measures of  t f ∆  
Full Sample: 1974:1-2001:3 
 
  A. Rejections at 1%(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level of H0:  t s ∆  fails to cause  t f ∆  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
   Canada  France  Germany  Italy  Japan  U.K. 
(1)  ) ( * m m− ∆    *    **  **   
(2)  ) ( * p p− ∆        ***  ***  ***  
(3)  * i i−    **      **   
(4)  ) ( * i i− ∆    **      ***   
(5)  ) ( * m m− ∆  
) ( * y y − ∆ −  
 *    *     
(6)  ) (
* y y − ∆             
 
  B. Rejections at 1%(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level of H0:  t f ∆  fails to cause  t s ∆  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
   Canada  France  Germany  Italy  Japan  U.K. 
(1)  ) ( * m m− ∆                 
(2)  ) ( * p p− ∆   *              
(3)  * i i−             **   
(4)  ) ( * i i− ∆                
(5)  ) ( * m m− ∆  
) ( * y y − ∆ −  
             
(6)  ) (
* y y − ∆             
Notes: 
 
1. See notes to earlier tables for variable definitions. 
 
2. Statistics are computed from fourth order bivariate vector autoregressions in  ) , ( ′ ∆ ∆ t t f s .  Because four 
observations were lost to initial conditions, the sample generally is 1975:2-2001:3, with exceptions as 
indicated in the notes to Table 3.1.  4
Table 4.3 
 
  Bivariate Granger Causality Tests, Different Measures of  t f ∆  
Early Part of Sample: 1974:1-1990:2 
 
  A. Rejections at 1%(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level of H0:  t s ∆  fails to cause  t f ∆  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
   Canada  France  Germany  Italy  Japan  U.K. 
(1)  ) ( * m m− ∆    **    *     
(2)  ) ( * p p− ∆       **  *** **   
(3)  * i i−    ***        * 
(4)  ) ( * i i− ∆    ***      **  ** 
(5)  ) ( * m m− ∆  
) ( * y y − ∆ −  
 **    **     
(6)  ) (
* y y − ∆          **   
 
  B. Rejections at 1%(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level of H0:  t f ∆  fails to cause  t s ∆  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
   Canada  France  Germany  Italy  Japan  U.K. 
(1)  ) ( * m m− ∆                 
(2)  ) ( * p p− ∆   *     *        
(3)  * i i−                
(4)  ) ( * i i− ∆                
(5)  ) ( * m m− ∆  
) ( * y y − ∆ −  
             
(6)  ) (




1. See notes to earlier tables for variable definitions.  5
Table 4.4 
 
  Bivariate Granger Causality Tests, Different Measures of  t f ∆  
Later Part of Sample: 1990:3-2001:3 
 
  A. Rejections at 1%(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level of H0:  t s ∆  fails to cause  t f ∆  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
   Canada  France  Germany  Italy  Japan  U.K. 
(1)  ) ( * m m− ∆    **      ***   
(2)  ) ( * p p− ∆   * ***    *       
(3)  * i i−      *    ** ** 
(4)  ) ( * i i− ∆     **    ** ** 
(5)  ) ( * m m− ∆  
) ( * y y − ∆ −  
 *        ** 
(6)  ) (
* y y − ∆          *   
 
  B. Rejections at 1%(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level of H0:  t f ∆  fails to cause  t s ∆  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
   Canada  France  Germany  Italy  Japan  U.K. 
(1)  ) ( * m m− ∆        **     **   
(2)  ) ( * p p− ∆    ***    **     
(3)  * i i−            ***  
(4)  ) ( * i i− ∆    **      ***   
(5)  ) ( * m m− ∆  
) ( * y y − ∆ −  
     **     **   
(6)  ) (




1. See notes to earlier tables for variable definitions.  6
Table 4.5 
 
VAR Causality Tests 
Full Sample: 1974:1-2001:3 
 
 
Rejections at 1%(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) 
Null Hypothesis A:   t s ∆  fails to cause  t f ∆  jointly 
Null Hypothesis B:   t f ∆  jointly fail to cause  t s ∆  
 
 
VAR Variables  in 
VAR 
 
 Canada  France  Germany Italy  Japan  U.K. 
A   *  **  *** ***     
1 
* () y y ∆− ,
* () p p ∆− , 
* ii −  
B            
A   **  *  *** ***     
2 
* () y y ∆− ,
* () p p ∆− , 
* () ii ∆−  
B            
A   **           
3 
* () mm ∆− , 
* () y y ∆−  
B            
A   **  *  ***  *     
4 
* () mm ∆− ,
* () y y ∆− ,
* () p p ∆−  
B            
A       **   ***       
5 
* () y y ∆− , 
* () p p ∆−  





1. See notes to earlier tables for variable definitions  7
Table 4.6 
 
Correlation between  t s ∆  and  t F ∆  
 
  A. Discount factor  5 . 0 = b  
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   Info 
Set 
France Germany  Italy  Japan 
(1)  * () mm ∆−   (a)  1t F  
 
 
(b)  2t F  
 
 


























(2)  * () p p ∆−   (a)  1t F  
 
 
(b)  2t F  
 
 



























(3)  * () ii ∆−   (a)  1t F  
 
 
(b)  2t F  
 
 



















(4)  * () mm ∆−  
* () y y −∆ −  
(a)  1t F  
 
 
(b)  2t F  
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B. Discount factor  9 . 0 = b  
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   Info 
Set 
France Germany  Italy  Japan 
(1)  * () mm ∆−   (a)  1t F  
 
 
(b)  2t F  
 
 



























(2)  * () p p ∆−   (a)  1t F  
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(4)  * () mm ∆−  
* () y y −∆ −  
(a)  1t F  
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Notes   
1 
1t F  and  2t F  are the expected discounted value of fundamentals, computed using lagged fundamentals 
alone ( 1t F ) or lagged fundamentals and lagged exchange rates ( 2t F ). 
 
2 The point estimates are the correlation between the change in the estimates of the expected present 
discounted values and the change in the actual exchange rate.  They may be interpreted as correlations between 
fitted and actual values. 
 
3The numbers in parentheses are 90 percent confidence intervals, computed from a nonparametric bootstrap  
 1
APPENDIX: VAR Causality Tests 
(Not intended for publication) 
Multivariate Granger Causality Tests, Different Measures of  t f ∆  
Full Sample: 1974:1-2001:3 
 
Table A.1 
A. Rejections at 1%(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level of H0:  t s ∆  fails to cause  t f ∆  
B.  Rejections at 1%(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level of H0:  t f ∆  fails to cause  t s ∆  
 
 (1)  (2)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
    Test  Performed Canada France Germany Italy Japan U.K. 
(1)  ) (
* y y − ∆   A. 
B. 
         




   ***  **     
(3)  * i i−   A. 
B. 
 **      ** 
* 
 
(4) All  variables  A. 
B. 




1. See notes to earlier tables for variable definitions. 
 
2. Statistics are computed from 4th order vector autoregressions in  ) ), ( ), ( , (
* * * ′ − − ∆ − ∆ ∆ t t t t t t t i i p p y y s .  
3.  “All variables” refers to the hypothesis that  ) ), ( ), ( (
* * * ′ − − ∆ − ∆ t t t t t t i i p p y y  jointly fail to cause  t s ∆ .  
 2
Table A.2 
A. Rejections at 1%(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level of H0:  t s ∆  fails to cause  t f ∆  
B.  Rejections at 1%(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level of H0:  t f ∆  fails to cause  t s ∆  
 
 (1)  (2)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
    Test  Performed Canada France Germany Italy Japan U.K. 
(1)  ) (
* y y − ∆   A. 
B. 
         




   ***  **     
(3)  ) (
* i i − ∆   A. 
B. 





(4) All  variables  A. 
B. 
 ** *  ***  ***   
Notes: 
 
1. See notes to earlier tables for variable definitions. 
2. Statistics computed from 4th order vector autoregressions in  ) ) ( ), ( ), ( , (
* * * ′ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ ∆ t t t t t t t i i p p y y s .  
 
Table A.3 
A. Rejections at 1%(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level of H0:  t s ∆  fails to cause  t f ∆  
B.  Rejections at 1%(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level of H0:  t f ∆  fails to cause  t s ∆  
 
 (1)  (2)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
    Test  Performed Canada France Germany Italy Japan U.K. 
(1)  ) (
* m m − ∆   A. 
B. 
     *  **   
(2)  ) (




          
(4) All  variables  A. 
B. 
 **         
Notes: 
 
1. See notes to earlier tables for variable definitions. 
2. Statistics computed from 4th order vector autoregressions in  ) ) ( ), ( , (
* * ′ − ∆ − ∆ ∆ t t t t t y y m m s .  
 3
Table A.4 
A. Rejections at 1%(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level of H0:  t s ∆  fails to cause  t f ∆  
B.  Rejections at 1%(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level of H0:  t f ∆  fails to cause  t s ∆  
 
 (1)  (2)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
    Test  Performed Canada France Germany Italy Japan U.K. 
(1)  ) (
* m m − ∆   A. 
B. 
     **  *   
(2)  ) (




          









(4) All  variables  A. 
B. 
 ** *  ***  *   
Notes: 
 
1. See notes to earlier tables for variable definitions. 
2. Statistics computed from 4th order VAR in  ) ) ( ), ( ), ( , (
* * * ′ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ ∆ t t t t t t t p p y y m m s .  
 
Table A.5 
A. Rejections at 1%(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level of H0:  t s ∆  fails to cause  t f ∆  
B.  Rejections at 1%(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level of H0:  t f ∆  fails to cause  t s ∆  
 
 (1)  (2)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
    Test  Performed Canada France Germany Italy Japan U.K. 
(1)  ) ( * p p− ∆   A. 
B. 
   ***  ***  **   
(2)  ) (




          
(4) All  variables  A. 
B. 
  **  ***     
Notes: 
 
1. See notes to earlier tables for variable definitions. 
2. Statistics computed from 4th order vector autoregressions in  ) ) ( ), ( , (
* * ′ − ∆ − ∆ ∆ t t t t t y y p p s . 
 
 